“A lot of time has to pass before things change. We’ve grown up with the corrupt government that we have, so we can’t take promises of change too seriously,” said Nicole Viloria ’26, the president of the Yale Venezuelan Club and an international student from Guarenas, Venezuela. On a sunny day outside of Yale University’s Pierson College, Viloria spoke of her love for her home country and her worries about the future in light of the recent Venezuelan election.
On July 28, 2024, Venezuelans streamed to polling places to make their voices heard, seeking to send the message that they no longer had confidence in the government of President Nicolas Maduro. Data suggests that nearly two-thirds of the Venezuelan electorate voted for the opposition candidate, Edmundo González, over Maduro. However, despite these overwhelming numbers, Maduro quickly claimed victory and, due to a “foreign terrorist cyber attack,” refused to release the actual results. At the same time, his administration unleashed a violent crackdown to silence the opposition, arresting an estimated 2,400 protestors. This episode was only the latest chapter in the 30-year unraveling of Venezuelan democracy—an unraveling that has transformed Venezuela from a democratic bastion to a country in economic and social freefall.
President Maduro’s response to the election disappointed many Venezuelans. “Part of us expected this to happen, but the hope for change had increased so much, making [the result] very frustrating,” Viloria explained. The overwhelming political sentiment is not one of shock but of pure and utter predictability.
Manuel Rueda, a Venezuelan journalist for NPR and the Associated Press, described in an interview with The Politic, “This election was like deja vu.” Since 1998, Chávez and Maduro have held increasingly undemocratic elections that have deteriorated public trust in institutions.
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The roots of Venezuela’s political and economic crises are complex but can be traced in large part to Venezuela’s complex relationship with oil. Fossil fuels compose roughly 90% of Venezuela’s exports, and the government relies heavily on oil revenue to fund services. When prices are high, the Venezuelan is flush with cash. When they are low, the government struggles to fund itself. The stability and popularity of Venezuelan governments are closely tied to global energy prices.
While the 1970s saw a rise in government revenues alongside oil prices, the 1980s brought a drastic fall in oil prices, leading to economic contraction and high inflation. Decreases in quality of life, an economic downturn, a $100 billion graft, and decreasing faith in the electoral system led the way for the increasing popularity of a leftist opposition party led by Hugo Chávez. In 1992, Chavez, a charismatic military officer with humble origins, attempted a coup. Though he failed to seize power, Chavez built popularity.
In 1998, running on a platform of decreasing inequality, combating poverty, and expanding social services, Chávez won the presidency. In retrospect, according to Doctor Fernando Bizzarro, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston College, “The 1998 election started a long process of democratic erosion.”
When Chávez was elected, he offered a strong alternative to the previous government. Early in his administration, Chavez was able to reduce poverty by 20%, and healthcare in the country improved drastically. Thus, when Chávez proposed to amend the Constitution, many in the working class had hoped this would create change for the better.
However, Chávez began using his popularity to expand presidential power, end term limits, limit the press, nationalize many businesses, and increase governmental loyalty. Bizzarro described Chávez’s reforms as the “combination of an erosion of a long-lived democracy that brought this outsider to power and [economic success] that created the conditions for him to enact many of these reforms and empower the presidency and the ruling party to reshape Venezuelan democracies.”
Lector Jorge Méndez-Seijas of Yale’s Department of Spanish offered insight into life in the country under Chávez’s government. Dr. Méndez-Seijas is from Los Teques, Venezuela, and lived there until 2014, when he left for a better education.
Méndez-Seijas’s experience in the Venezuelan university system showed him the reality of a country with diminishing funds and space for free thought. He witnessed the beginning of the brain drain, as “many professors left or retired as the next generation of professionals chose to pursue education elsewhere.” Méndez-Seijas left for Spain during the second year of his PhD when he realized his opportunities to research and engage intellectually were severely limited in Venezuela. Teachers, nurses, doctors, and many with high earning potential in other fields also left the country. While they have attempted to overcome the shortage of teachers through crash courses for young adults, this same method cannot be employed with medical professionals, leaving the country with a severe drought of medical providers.
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“Everyone was celebrating, everyone was going crazy,” said Nicole Viloria.
Viloria described the day Chávez died as “one of the best days of [her] life.” She recounted running through the mall with her grandmother, being ecstatic when she got back home, and seeing everyone celebrating.
Not yet a teenager, Viloria now admits she did not understand the gravity of the situation, simply that “everything bad that happened in Venezuela was because of [Chávez].”
Not everyone viewed the situation similarly. According to Shannon O’Neil at the Council on Foreign Relations, before his death, Chávez still had some of the highest approval ratings in the region at around 64%. This was a result of his initial economic success and sustained promise of change that many believed.
When Chávez died in 2013, his successor, Nicolas Maduro, promised the improvement of the Venezuelan economy. Maduro advocated for price controls, profit limits, and a reduction in imports, creating new governmental powers to be able to enact his reforms. He began by ordering stores around the nation to cut prices by half. These actions allowed him to gain some economic populism and initial support from the public.
Despite this hope, Viloria described that many still felt weary about the possibility of change: “It takes time for our confidence to develop. We doubted how much Maduro could live up to his promises. Even as Maduro came to power, we made jokes about the true impact he would have.”
Soon after Maduro took office, Venezuela entered a recession with strong inflation and unemployment due to falling oil prices. His economic stronghold coupled with sanctions kept economic activity low. The poor economic state caused unrest. Maduro responded by cracking down and consolidating his power.
As time went on, Maduro used his increasing powers to go after his political opponents, commit electoral malpractice, and censor those he disagreed with. In 2018, he retained power through a largely undemocratic and unfair election condemned by the democracies of the world. By 2021, his loyalists had the leadership of the National Assembly, the final bastion of opposition control.
Maduro was less concerned with popular sentiment than Chávez had been, taking a stronger hand in ensuring he got his way. Viloria described how this manifested itself: “Chávez would say things that made sense. Maduro doesn’t make any sense.” Even though Viloria disagreed with Chávez’s actions, he tended to justify his actions more than Maduro.
“For the past few years, Venezuela has been a closed authoritarian regime, and closed authoritarian regimes are not really friendly with giving power away,” argued Bizzarro. With Maduro’s power at its strongest, the stage was set for the 2024 election.
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“The problem is that Venezuela continues to move into a harsher and harsher dictatorship,” Manuel Rueda, a journalist for NPR and the Associated Press, told The Politic.
Leading up to the 2024 presidential election, there were opportunities for the Venezuelan economy to be stimulated, possibly encouraging democratic reforms. In light of the Russia-Ukraine War’s impact on energy prices in 2022, the United States took an enormous step to help Venezuela’s economy, opening diplomatic channels. Chevron, the American oil giant, was permitted to resume operations in exchange for communication between the two countries. This led to the Barbados Agreement between Maduro’s government and the opposition coalition in October 2023, representing an end to the long stalemate of formal negotiations. The Barbados Agreement attempted to make the July 2024 elections more fair by updating the electoral registry, inviting international observers, and granting both sides equal access to the media. Sanctions were eased and exports began to rise.
With a regime like Maduro’s, however, there had to be a certain victory. Bizzarro described, “If they didn’t win the election just completely outright, they would be close enough that they could make some kind of shenanigans to just pretend they were right.” This agreement and the considerations behind it likely coincided with the beginnings of Maduro’s plans to secure the election in his favor if need be.
One of Maduro’s strategies was vetting, which went directly against the authorize-all-candidates memo of the Barbados Agreement. In June 2023, María Corina Machado, leader of the Unitary Platform Party (PUD), a popular opposition alliance, was banned from running for office for 15 years for supporting U.S. sanctions against Venezuela. Prior to this, Machado showed strong opposition unity by winning 93% of votes in their independent primary election.
After Machado was banned, 74-year-old Edmundo González Urrutia, a retired diplomat and academic, was put forward as the opposition candidate. While González was the official candidate, Machado was still the effective face of the opposition, taking an active role in the campaign.
As 2024 began and Venezuela’s reality of a free and fair election was becoming less practical, the United States reimposed sanctions over a territorial dispute with Guyana. Chevron was still allowed to operate, but the economy and diplomacy were once again hampered. The Barbados Agreement was all but shredded.
The increased economic and political turmoil led Maduro to lose some confidence in his campaign. To mitigate this risk, according to Bizzarro, “they thought, over the months leading up to the election, [Maduro’s regime] will begin to engage in authoritarian behavior and distribute money to groups so they can be brought to the polling stations and vote for us.”
Despite the rising political tensions, Viloria said, “On the more hopeful side, during Copa America, the Venezuelan team started winning. It was a very exciting and hopeful moment for Venezuela. Everyone felt very united. I even felt that if we could overcome boundaries to do well in soccer, could we do the same in the election?”
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“But then, eventually, it became obvious that they would not be able to do that. They would actually lose the election. One or two months ago, they knew they weren’t going to win; that’s when they started cracking down further,” explained Bizzarro. Bizzarro’s claim found confirmation in Maduro’s actions over recent months.
With opposition candidates banned, staffers arrested, protests squashed, international observers barred, and the threat of violence blowing with the wind, the vote on whether this election would be free and fair was cast well before the election day.
Nonetheless, on the morning of July 28, 2024, the opposition was ready to prevent the election from being stolen. On election day, the opposition gathered about 73.2% of the voting receipts and published them on a website which showed González winning about 7.3 million votes (about 67% of the total).
Maduro’s regime quickly denied all claims of an opposition victory. While they may have originally thought that a loss would be slim and easily able to reconcile, they did not expect the loss to be this significant, so “they scrambled and tried to find a way out of the situation they put themselves in,” explained Bizzarro.
In the words of Bizzarro, “the government is attempting to avoid mobilization from the majority. He has been trying to remove all chances of a coup. In many ways, however, he has underestimated the passion to which people would take to advocacy, which is why he has reacted so strongly.” The opposition is equally strong; Bizzarro described the opposition’s perspective as “let’s burn the country down until they give up.”
Despite the hope that many, like Ms. Viloria, attempted to keep, the reality soon set in, an emotional and frustrating truth that Venezuela was not going to change. The hands controlling the puppet strings were the same worn ones from 25 years before.
The opposition has kept the fire burning in massive peaceful protests involving tens of thousands throughout the country, particularly in the capital of Caracas. From Spain, González, who was originally thrust into the situation, strongly advocates for democracy. From hiding, Machado calls for the continuation of anti-Maduro sentiment and for the people to keep fighting. Elsewhere in the world, including in New Haven, there have been massive protests organized by expatriated Venezuelans and concerned non-Venezuelans alike.
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Maduro has all but driven the opposition out of the political sphere. While Machado holds online rallies from undisclosed locations, González left for Spain soon after the election. Viloria described the danger that many face: “Protests have begun to lower due to the amount of arrests the government has made. Protesting is very risky. Some parents discourage their children from going to protest or even posting on social media.”
Many basic human rights are violated on a daily basis as Maduro pursues a violent shutdown of all opposition, no matter how small. In one example, Bizzarro described a Venezuelan lady selling empanadas: “One day, she received a visit from Machado. The story of Machado buying empanadas spread, and, by the next day, the government had arrested the woman and taken away her cart, her sole means of income.” In Maduro’s mind, disproportionate responses are necessary to deter all disloyalty. Much of this reaction is impromptu. According to Bizzarro, “there is no blueprint for coup-proofing.” While Maduro has cemented his rule, his actions have led to a continued fervor by the opposition.
With regard to the free press, Rueda described, “Only the newspapers that print government propaganda are allowed to publish. The others don’t even get access to paper. The government censors through firewalls, stripping broadcasting licenses, and other methods. Recently, Maduro campaigned for people to delete WhatsApp. The only reliable way to access unbiased media is through VPNs. It is a very limited media landscape.”
This coup-proofing has driven immense amounts of people out of the country, particularly across the Columbian border. According to the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, 7.7 million people (one-quarter of the country’s current population) left Venezuela due to safety or economic issues, with over one million being asylum-seekers and 230,000 being recognized refugees. According to Rueda, the process of leaving is becoming more difficult. “So many Venezuelans have left in recent years that the neighboring countries are not so welcome anymore. The governments in these countries have put all kinds of barriers on Venezuelans living there,” he said. As many leave, the workforce is experiencing significant shortages. In the south of the country, many breakaway groups have caused anarchy and further eroded the safety and sanctity of an already troubled region.
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Just as Maduro’s reaction to this election did not surprise Venezuelans, many also struggle to see a path forward under the current Maduro regime.
Political scholars like Bizzarro believe that the transition back to democracy will be extremely difficult. Bizzarro saw some traditional tactics, like sanctions, as being less effective. “Sanctions are tough to balance in countries like Iran and Venezuela. These countries have internal sources of revenue, and, with firms like Chevron, Venezuela will continue having this capital. Venezuela has many back-doors to other markets and other countries, easily subverting sanctions,” he explained.
“The Venezuelan opposition seems to think that the path forward is negotiation,” Bizzarro described, “To weaken the current government, the opposition must create an incentive for current members of the administration to defect. Given the strong loyalty of many of these leaders, it will require some ability of the opposition to make promises to the ruling coalition that things will be different from what they have now.”
With these strong barriers to opposition within Venezuela, Bizzarro predicted, “the opposition will require the support of other powerful countries to back up their promises. In the light of the many democratic transitions worldwide, this seems unlikely to be immediate.”
Rueda similarly sees the complexity of finding a solution. He does believe that, if a solution comes, it will be prior to the beginning of Maduro’s next term in January, at which point the opposition may lose some passion and grounds to eliminate his power without a coup. Rueda sees Machado as a continuing leader of Venezuelan democratic ambitions that, like Bizzarro, is dependent on other countries maintaining pressure.
Mendez-Seijas offered some hope: “I want to see the light at the end of the tunnel, and I think it’s positive that many people want such dramatic changes. The country has people that want things to be better, so can they do it?”
When the headlines each day deliver news of suppression, the opposition is driven further into hiding. The people have fewer rights and opportunities and the path forward becomes unrecognizably obscured. Yet, the people of Venezuela are inherently hopeful. If they cannot have hope, what can they have?
As Méndez-Seijas put it: “I don’t know how we can turn things around, but there’s light at the end of the tunnel. Why not?”