This piece was written by a contributing Tsinghua student for The Future of U.S.–China Relations, a joint special issue by The Yale Politic and Tsinghua Youth Voice.
Abstract
This article investigates how American think tanks utilize the “Translating China” Initiatives—efforts to decode Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cultural discourse and political propaganda—to shape perceptions of Taiwanese national identity as democratically distinct. By scrutinizing the CCP’s discursive power, institutions like the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Brookings Institution, and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) proffer expert analyses that promote international transparency and accountability. Simultaneously, these think tanks strategically skew public opinion towards U.S.-aligned foreign policy stances that foster resistance identities to reunification efforts and potentially risk augmented cross-strait tensions… Integrating public opinion data, the article demonstrates how such efforts bolster the public perception of the Taiwanese as autonomous.
Introduction
In the landscape of U.S.-China competition, American think tanks are pivotal actors who influence global narratives about the People’s Republic of China (PRC). One means of doing so is through the “Translating China” initiatives, a broad set of efforts exposing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) discursive power through the translation and analysis of the party’s documents, speeches, and media. Initially one project by the Freeman Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the “Translating China” initiatives now encompass programs across U.S. think tanks, including CSIS’s “Interpret: China,” the Brookings Institution’s “Lost in Translation” series, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s (CEIP) analyses of CCP rhetoric. These initiatives promote international transparency and accountability by providing non-Chinese speakers with access to essential, albeit overlooked, primary sources. This article argues that these series strategically present CCP propaganda in ways that emphasize Taiwan’s democratic distinctiveness, fostering resistance identities to reunification and pro-independence sentiments, which risk heightened cross-strait tensions. This analysis is particularly relevant to the special issue theme on global power dynamics in an era of great-power rivalry, as it could be related to Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power. And the initiative leverages intellectual resources, chiefly based in the US, to mold social and political perceptions of Taiwan’s identity formation. Yet, the mechanism requires scrutiny: Taiwan, a Chinese-language society, already has direct access to PRC messaging. So, why do U.S. translations matter? The answer lies in the framing and dissemination channels of these think tanks, which amplify U.S.-aligned foreign policy stances through social media platforms and policy circles, often portraying reunification as coercive and Taiwan as sovereign.
The article will first examine the evolution of the “Translating China” initiative, incorporating recent developments under the second Trump Administration. It will then examine the non-neutral framing of translations and concrete means by which they contribute to Taiwanese identity shifts, evidenced by public opinion data. Finally, it addresses the risks and forward-looking implications, emphasizing the need for balanced U.S. think tank strategies amid shifting administrations.
The “Translating China” Initiatives: Overview and Evolution
The “Translating China” initiative originated in the late 2010s amid escalating U.S.-China tensions; it revived the U.S.’s Cold War-era practices of translating adversary documents for strategic advantage. As Gao Yuxia and Ren Dongsheng note in their 2024 analysis, the U.S. has an evolving history of using open-source intelligence to monitor power competition with China, from attempts made by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service during the Cold War to post-9/11 expansions. The modern iteration gained momentum with the 2017 National Security Strategy, which labeled China as a revisionist power, prompting increased focus on decoding CCP ideology.
CSIS’s “Translating China” Project, launched in October 2020, exemplified this. It commissioned translations of “largely ignored” CCP materials to reveal the party’s “goals, ambitions, and capabilities”. For instance, an analysis of CCP statements on Taiwan from 2012 to 2023 emphasized Beijing’s “unification” rhetoric as coercive, contrasting it with the importance of Taiwan’s discretionary autonomy.
Other think tanks have adopted similar approaches. The Carnegie Endowment’s 2023 report “The Many ‘One Chinas’” analyzes the implications of CCP reunification to underscore Taiwan’s multicultural heritage against mainland homogeneity. The Heritage Foundation’s briefs advocate for increased U.S.-Taiwan interactions to counter CCP narratives—linking translations to policy recommendations like enhanced U.S. military support of Taiwan.
Recent developments under the second Trump Administration have intensified these efforts by institutionalizing regular reviews and updates to U.S. policy guidelines on engagement with Taiwan through new legislation, expanding funding for translation projects focused on CCP propaganda, and integrating these initiatives more deeply into national security strategies—actions that are viewed positively for enhancing transparency, U.S.-Taiwan ties, and resistance to Chinese influence, but negatively for escalating informational warfare, polarizing narratives, and heightening cross-strait tensions by portraying China as an existential threat. The Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act (TAIA), passed in November 2025 and signed into law in December 2025, bolstered U.S.-Taiwan relations by strengthening the State Department’s oversight over official engagement with Taiwan—in turn, challenging UN Resolution 2758, which recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate representative of China in the United Nations and expelled the representatives of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from the organization. This aligns with Trump’s “America First” strategy, which uses information warfare against China to promote American national security interests, protectionism, and economic nationalism. RAND’s September 2025 commentary on “Taiwan’s Will to Fight” translates CCP propaganda to argue that U.S. support bolsters Taiwanese resilience.
In an interview, Zhu Guilan, Associate Research Fellow and Taiwan Studies Researcher at the School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, emphasized that recent U.S. think tank practices increasingly function as a form of “cognitive deterrence.” According to Zhu, by pre-releasing analytical interpretations of potential Chinese military actions through influential policy institutions such as RAND and CSIS, Washington can “shape expectations before events occur,” thereby framing Beijing’s strategic behavior as inherently escalatory regardless of subsequent developments. She argued that this anticipatory framing does not merely inform external audiences but actively conditions regional perception, particularly in Taiwan, where such analyses are frequently re-circulated by media and policy communities. In Zhu’s view, this strategy lowers uncertainty for U.S. allies while simultaneously increasing psychological pressure on Beijing, effectively extending deterrence into the cognitive domain rather than the conference room alone.
Politically-Charged Framing in U.S. Translations
A core point of contention over this outgrowth of CCP translation programming is that U.S. think tanks are not ideologically neutral: they embed frameworks against CCP authoritarianism into their rewordings and analyses. As Gao and Ren (2024) argue, these efforts revive Cold War tactics, cherry-picking translated documents to highlight forceful CCP rhetoric. This binary framing—authoritarianism versus democracy—aligns with U.S. narratives of liberal international order, values-based foreign policy, and the moralization of great-power competition, but spurs cross-strait divisions by neglecting cultural ties and amplifying ideological divides.
Recent think tank reports commissioned during the Trump Administration reflect continuity with earlier hawkish shifts, particularly in how translated CCP materials are used to frame Beijing’s actions as inherently escalatory. While institutions such as CSIS and RAND emphasize deterrence and resilience, the Quincy Institute offers a counterpoint, translating CCP responses to argue for de-escalation and strategic restraint. This divergence highlights how translation itself functions as a political tool rather than a neutral analytical practice.
In an interview, Zhang Yang, a second-year law student at Xinya College, Tsinghua University, observed that U.S. think tank analyses often pre-structure expectations by interpreting Chinese military signaling through a lens of inevitability and threat. Such framing, he noted, simplifies policy narratives but leaves limited room for legal ambiguity or diplomatic alternatives. As Gao and Ren (2024) warn, this amplification risks misrepresenting nuance and escalating tensions by portraying the CCP as an existential threat.
The Influence of U.S. Translations on Taiwanese Identity
U.S. translations shape Taiwanese identity formation through transmissive media sources that interact with existing security anxieties to amplify narratives of Taiwan independence. Despite direct access to PRC media outlets, Taiwanese audiences engage with U.S. think tanks’ interpretations for their analytical depth and perceived credibility, building upon longstanding distrust of Beijing rather than generating it anew. As Gao Yuxia explains in her 2024 study on U.S. translation practices and cross-strait discourse, her analysis of the “Translating China” initiative, U.S. translations “feed into” local discourse via social platforms and youth movements, fostering “resistance identities” to CCP authoritarianism. This translation process is not passive for Taiwanese commonfolk; it involves active recirculation and reinterpretation of U.S.-framed content. By critiquing CCP propaganda, U.S. think tanks encourage the Taiwanese masses to perceive their country as distinct and sovereign. Polling data underscores how U.S. think tanks’ support for Taiwan’s democratic autonomy mobilizes the Taiwanese public’s identity-perception as increasingly self-governed, especially with recent cross-strait tensions.
1. Recirculation Through Taiwanese Media Outlets
First, Taiwanese media acts as a primary conduit for disseminating research produced by U.S. think tanks, embedding them into everyday public discourse and manipulating collective perceptions of CCP threats to Taiwanese democratic identity. Major outlets such as Liberty Times and United Daily News frequently cite reports from institutions like CSIS, Brookings, and Carnegie. Their recirculation of think tanks’ works goes beyond CCP text translations, providing analyses that resonate with Taiwanese audiences wary of Beijing’s reunification intentions.
For instance, CSIS’s translation and analysis of CCP reunification claims in their “Interpret: China” series arguably manipulated the linguistics of the CCP papers to argue that the PRC undermines Taiwanese agency through veiled threats of coercion. Liberty Times covered this development extensively, headlining it as evidence of “Beijing’s psychological warfare.” Such reporting prompted a record high of anti-annexation rhetoric—reflected in polls from National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center showing 67% of respondents identifying as “Taiwanese only” in 2023. Taiwanese media’s amplification of think tank reporting creates a feedback loop: the U.S. propounds local CCP suspicions, which reinforces a narrative of Taiwan as a democratic bulwark against authoritarian encroachment, in turn, further provoking pro-Taiwanese independence rhetoric. Under the second Trump Administration, this closed loop has evolved with real-time events.
In an interview, Xie Borun, a third-year undergraduate law student at the Department of Law, Tsinghua University, noted that this feedback loop is especially persuasive because it presents political interpretation as objective expertise. According to Xie, when interpretations are repeatedly cited by both U.S. institutions and Taiwanese media, they acquire a “quasi-legal authority”, shaping how sovereignty, agency, and coercion are understood by the public. He argued that this process does not simply reflect existing opinion but gradually redefines the normative boundaries of acceptable political imagination, making alternative readings of cross-strait relations increasingly marginal.
2. Amplification of De Facto Sovereignty Rhetoric through U.S. Social Media and Online Forums
Second, U.S.-based social media and online forums serve as democratizing platforms that viralize U.S.-framed content, particularly among younger demographics. Platforms like Facebook and Instagram allow users to share translated excerpts and analyses, often with added commentary that adapts U.S. critiques to local contexts. This user-generated amplification bypasses traditional gatekeepers, enabling rapid dissemination of reunification criticisms and collective sense-making around cross-strait security risks, political identity, and perceptions of sovereignty.
For example, RAND’s 2025 translation and analysis of CCP propaganda documents focused on dismantling narratives of “inevitable reunification,” reframing them as strategic messaging designed to normalize coercion over time. Rather than remaining within policy circles, these translations circulated widely across online forums and social media platforms, where users debated whether the language revealed latent threats or merely reflected long-standing political positioning.
In an interview, Chen Yifan, an undergraduate at Peking University, noted that RAND’s translations gain particular traction online because they combine technical authority with accessible narrative framing. According to Chen, this blend allows complex strategic assessments to be “absorbed into everyday political discussion,” especially among students and young professionals following Taiwan-related developments.
This digital mechanism is particularly effective at shaping younger generations’ political convictions on China-Taiwan relations. Younger users, influenced by globalized content, use memes and infographics derived from Brookings or Carnegie reports to counter CCP reunification claims, as seen in discussions following the implementation of the 2025 Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act (TAIA). Social media threads linked Heritage Foundation analyses to the bill’s passage, portraying it as a validation of de facto independence. Gao (2024) argues that this online virality creates “echo chambers” of resistance, where U.S. translations empower users to reject and ignore Taiwanese cultural ties with the mainland, bolstering anti-unification sentiment and solidifying “Taiwanese-first” mentalities.
3. Empowerment Through Taiwanese Youth-Led Movements and Activism
Third, youth movements and civil society activism draw heavily on U.S. frames to mobilize and articulate “Taiwanese-first” identities, transforming abstract analyses into lived resistance. Grassroots youth efforts like the 2014 Sunflower Movement, which emerged in opposition to the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement and emphasized procedural democracy, transparency, and sovereignty concerns, use translated materials to educate and rally participants.
The Carnegie Endowment’s 2023 report on the CCP, which employed cultural anthropology to expose the CCP’s manipulative reunification propaganda, has been pivotal in empowering younger generations. Activists share such translations and analyses on online platforms and at protests, framing Taiwan’s multicultural heritage against mainland claims. Their advocacy has exacerbated anti-unification sentiments, corroborated by surveys that show Taiwanese youth increasingly support de facto independence, with recent polls indicating that among younger demographics (often under 35), support for maintaining or leaning toward independence in hypothetical scenarios exceeds 60% in some cases, while “Taiwanese-only” identity remains dominant at over 60-70% in longitudinal data from sources like National Chengchi University.
Yet the implications of youth activism on Taiwanese sovereignty is a double-edged sword: while enhancing resilience, it risks international escalation by provoking stronger Chinese military signaling, gray-zone coercion, or even miscalculated confrontations in the Taiwan Strait, as Beijing interprets vocal pro-independence youth mobilization and related civil society actions as steps toward formal separation that could justify heightened pressure or preemptive measures to deter perceived threats to national reunification. Youth movements, fueled by U.S. translations, polarize external relations but strengthen internal cohesion.
In an interview, Zhang Letian, a sophomore at New York University majoring in business and originally from Shanghai, China , illustrates the transnational reach and transformative potential of these U.S.-framed resources even among those from the mainland. Zhang, who grew up with mainstream PRC narratives emphasizing shared Chinese heritage and eventual peaceful reunification, viewed Taiwan’s push for a distinct identity with skepticism.
4. Empirical Links and Dual-Edged Implications
Empirical links between U.S. think tank translations/analyses (and their recirculation in Taiwanese media and discourse) and shifts in national identity are evident in longitudinal polls: Chengchi University’s data shows “Taiwanese” identification rising from around 54-55% in 2018 to approximately 62-63% in recent years (with December 2025 figures at 62.0% identifying as Taiwanese only, 2.5% as Chinese only, and 31.7% as both), correlating with heightened awareness of perceived coercive CCP reunification tactics amplified via U.S. sources. Gao (2024) argues these tactics create a “dual-edged” effect: enhancing the Taiwanese public’s resilience against CCP-produced disinformation but also polarizing cross-strait cultural and ideological affiliations.
In the current Trump era, with policies like the TAIA bill and arms sales receiving continued support, these mechanisms may both intensify identity-based divisions while lessening or abating military escalation risks through strengthened deterrence and public resolve. Future studies should provide insight into how U.S. global strategies can and should influence this unfolding tension.
Conclusion
The “Translating China” initiative exemplifies how U.S. think tanks’ translations and analyses wield soft power over points of international diplomatic friction—especially in shaping emerging political, social, and cultural self-perceptions of Taiwan’s democratic autonomy and cross-strait tensions.
In the current Trump era, with policies like TAIA and arms sales, anti-annexation U.S.-based think tank analyses may intensify under “America First” priorities, potentially heightening cross-strait tensions and anti-Chinese rhetoric. Looking forward, U.S.-grounded think tank advocacy should arguably balance translative transparency with de-escalatory frameworks to mitigate unintended wars. For Taiwan, engaging with diverse media sources could foster nuanced cultural and political identities, reducing polarization in the long run. Ultimately, as great-power rivalries evolve, ethical translation practices will determine whether such initiatives bridge understanding or deepen divides.